

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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SECRET

Control: 6646

Rec'd: JUNE 22, 1961

5:42 P.M.

EXCISE

001

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 1294, JUNE 22, 7 P.M.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT POLTO 1294, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON POLTO 274, BONN POLTO 230, BERLIN POLTO 73, MOSCOW POLTO 78

SPECIAL NAC MEETING, JUNE 22 - - POLICY ON BERLIN AND GERMANY.

I TOOK UP WITH NAC THIS MORNING, AFTER KILLIAN HAD REPORTED ON INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE, HIS CONCERN AT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF LACK OF INFORMATION TO NAC REGARDING MAJOR PROBLEM OF BERLIN. HE REFERRED TO JUNE 21 LONDON TIMES STORY MENTIONING CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO PARTIAL MOBILIZATION OF NATO FORCES AND JUNE 22 NEW YORK TIMES DREW MIDDLETON ARTICLE ON POSSIBLE UNIT REGROUPMENT. THIS LED HIM TO BELIEVE SERIOUS MATTERS MIGHT BE UNDER CONSIDERATION WHICH AFFECTED ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. HE STRESSED THAT QUESTIONS SUCH AS RAISED BY THESE ARTICLES -- E.G. MOBILIZATION -- RAISED SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT REQUIRED EARLIEST POSSIBLE DISCUSSION IN NAC IF SUPPORT FROM NATO COUNTRIES TO BE OBTAINED. HE THEN TURNED TO FOUR POWER PAPER ON BERLIN PROPAGANDA THEMES (POLTO 1742), SAID HE GENERALLY AGREED WITH THEM BUT THOUGHT THAT IN VIEW THEREOF IT WAS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT NATO THOROUGHLY UNDERSTAND POLICY BEHIND THOSE THEMES, AND THAT NAC SHOULD HAVE EARLY DISCUSSION THEREON.

I TRIED TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION BY POINTING OUT THE PROBLEM THAT EXISTED AS TO THE PROPER STAGE OF BRINGING THE NAC INTO CONSULTATIONS. I SAID THAT WHEN I WAS BACK IN WASHINGTON THERE HAD BEEN MANY IDEAS UNDER DISCUSSION /BUT THAT

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BUT THAT THE SITUATION WAS STILL SO FLUID THAT IF REPORTS WERE TO BE MADE TO THE NAC THEY MIGHT VARY FROM DAY TO DAY. I SAID I HAD NO AUTHORITY AS YET TO REPORT ON THE FOUR POWER TALKS IN WASHINGTON BUT I THOUGHT THEY HAD NOT REACHED ANY CONCLUSIVE STAGE. I STRESSED THAT THE POLICY ON BERLIN WAS FIRM AND WELL KNOWN TO NAC AND THAT WE WERE MAINLY CONSIDERING TACTICS, AND RENEWED MY SUGGESTION THAT THE NAC MIGHT WISH TO INITIATE DISCUSSION IN WHICH MEMBERS MIGHT PUT FORTH SUGGESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE FOUR POWERS BEFORE FIRM DECISIONS WERE REACHED.

THE UK AND FRENCH PERMREPS SUPPORTED MY STATEMENT, THE FRENCH INDICATING THAT THE WASHINGTON TALKS HAD DEALT ONLY WITH THE REPLY TO THE SOVIET AIDE-MEMOIRE AND THE UK NOTING THAT THIS WOULD SHORTLY BE PRESENTED FOR NAC CONSIDERATION.

THIS DID NOT SATISFY THE COUNCIL. WITH B1  
[ ] TAKING THE LEAD, THERE WAS STRONG PRESSURE THAT A PROMPT PROGRESS REPORT BE MADE ON THE WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS. BUT GOING BEYOND THAT, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE NEWS ARTICLES UNDOUBTEDLY HAD SOME FOUNDATION AND WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT EFFECTS ON PUBLIC OPINION SINCE THEY WERE IN SERIOUS PAPERS AND PUT FORTH "EXPLOSIVE" IDEAS EMPHASIZING MILITARY ASPECTS AND USE OF FORCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, [ ] ALSO REFERRED TO PRESS STORIES ON U.S. GIVING UP FOUR BASES IN BRITAIN AS HAVING RELATED IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION. B1

[ ] SUGGESTED REPRESENTATIVE OF WORKING GROUP ON BERLIN MIGHT MEET WITH NAC PERIODICALLY AS HAD BEEN PRACTICE IN EARLIER YEARS. B1

AFTER [

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[ ] EXPRESSED DOUBTS ON PROPAGANDA  
/THEME IN B1

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THEME IN FOUR POWER PAPER STRESSING WESTERN RIGHTS IN BERLIN, [ ] CONCLUDED DISCUSSION BY SAYING HE FELT NEWS ARTICLES BY SUCH RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISTS MUST HAVE SOME FOUNDATION AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE DISCUSSION OF POLICY IN NAC BEFORE IT APPEARS IN PRESS. NAC WILL PROBABLY RESUME DISCUSSION AT CONCLUSION SPECIAL MEETING TOMORROW ON NATO STRATEGY. B1

COMMENT: I THINK IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE BE ABLE GIVE NAC A PROMPT PROGRESS REPORT ON THE RECENT FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. COULD YOU PROVIDE ME WITH ANYTHING FOR TOMORROW?

IN ADDITION, I SUBMIT THAT IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT A COMMON LINE BE WORKED OUT IN THE COUNCIL PROMPTLY ON SUCH THINGS AS THESE PRESS STORIES. NOTHING IS GOING TO BE MORE HARMFUL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON STRONG ALLIANCE-WIDE PUBLIC OPINION ON THE BERLIN ISSUE THAN FALSE STARTS AND DOUBTS ON SUCH THINGS AS THESE STORIES ON MOBILIZATION. THIS WILL REQUIRE MORE THAN A MERE DENIAL THAT THERE IS FOUR POWER AGREEMENT ON THESE MATTERS. IT REALLY CALLS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE THEREOF IN THE FULL NAC PROMPTLY. SUCH A DISCUSSION COULD PROVIDE A GOOD INDICATION OF THE SORT OF PROBLEMS WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH HERE, AND MAY SUGGEST THE WISEST WAY OF DEALING WITH THEM.

FINLETTER

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\* serial number correction to follow.

Note: Mr. Tobin (RA) informed 10:25 p.m. 6-22-61 FMH

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